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ABSTRACT
The U.S.S.C. expanded the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act's safe harbor provision in Merck I1 to
include protection for infringing use of any type of invention as long as a researcher intended to
perform research reasonably relevant to FDA approval. This broad interpretation is inconsistent
with the legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the policies of the U.S. patent system.
Many patent owners may unnecessarily experience such a reduction in their property rights as to
constitute a regulatory taking. The proposed narrow interpretation would rectify the constitutional
problems and inconsistencies in infringement exemptions. Section 271(e)(1) should apply only to the
invention studied, and even then, "solely" for the limited purpose of obtaining FDA approval. This
approach would allow courts to balance the need for safe and effective drug equivalents with the
right of the patent owner to the exclusive use of his invention in addition to promoting the progress
of science.

Copyright © 2006 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Tara Stuart, Comment, Has the Supreme CourtIncorrectly
Expanded§ 271 (e)(1) to Risk a Regulatory Taking?, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP.

L. 216 (2006).

HAS THE SUPREME COURT INCORRECTLY EXPANDED
REGULATORY TAKING?

§ 271(E)(1) TO RISK A

TARA STUART*

INTRODUCTION

"As far as the text is concerned ...we have before us a provision .. .that is not
plainly comprehensible on anyone's view."'
Twice, the United States Supreme Court ("U.S.S.C.") has attempted to define
the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the safe harbor provision intended to expedite the
entry of generic pharmaceuticals into the market, by providing a limited exemption
against patent infringement lawsuits. 2 In the course of defining the scope of the
exemption, the U.S.S.C. created a broad safety zone against infringement lawsuits,
protecting not only generic pharmaceutical companies, but also pharmaceutical
3
companies that create innovative drugs.
To bring an innovative pharmaceutical to market requires an average of
fourteen years and financial expenditures ranging between $500 million and $2.2
billion. 4 Before a company is permitted to market a drug, whether innovative or
generic, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") requires testing to
ensure the drug is effective and safe for human consumption. 5
The large
expenditures required to develop and market an innovative drug would likely deter
many companies from engaging in the endeavor were it not for U.S. patent laws,
which grant the right to exclude all others from the use and sale of the patented item
for a period of time. 6 In exchange for the right to exclude, the inventors obtaining the

* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Chemistry, June 1996, De
Paul University. M.S. Chemistry, August 2002, Indiana University. I would like to specifically
thank my husband Doug for his patience and encouragement, and my son Colin for making life fun
and interesting. Finally, thank you to the staff of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law, particularly Karen Mitch and Art Sokolov, for their invaluable editorial assistance.
Any mistakes in this article are my own.
1 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
2 Id. at 663; Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2376 (2005).
3See Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382.
4 See TUFTS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, OUTLOOK REPORT 1 (2002),
http://esdd.tufts.edu/infoservices/outlookpdfs/outlook2002.pdf (estimating the average cost of a new
pharmaceutical at $800 million, and the typical time at 10 to 15 years); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N
& DEPT. OF JUSTICE-ANTITRUST DIv., COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETPLACE 4
(2002), http://www.fte.gov/opp/intellect/020319gregoryjglover.pdf (statement of Gregory J. Glover on
behalf of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America) ("average total
pharmaceutical development time [was] 14.2 years in the 1980s and 1990s"); Christopher P. Adams
& Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New PharmaeeutiealDevelopment: Is It Really $802m2?
SOC. Sci.RES. NETWORK (Dec. 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=640563 (analysis of the typical cost to
bring a new pharmaceutical to market).

Seo genera]]y 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
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patent must fully disclose their invention.7 In the case of drugs, this disclosure
allows generic drug companies to copy the innovative drug immediately upon
expiration of its patent term.
Although ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs is an important public policy,
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval process had some undesirable
effects on the patent term, which were detrimental to innovative pharmaceutical
companies, generic pharmaceutical companies, and consumers.8 Prior to 1984, the
year § 271(e)(1) was enacted, innovative pharmaceutical companies spent a
substantial part of their patent term performing testing needed to gain approval by
the FDA. 9 This reduced the time of exclusivity in the market, which was when the
innovative pharmaceutical companies were most likely to recoup their research and
development expenditures and earn a profit. Before 1984, the FDA also required
generic drug companies to perform extensive tests on their products before they were
sold, even if they were seemingly identical to an innovative drug already on the
market. 10 However, the generic pharmaceutical companies could not begin testing of
their generic drugs pursuant to FDA approval until the patent term of the equivalent
innovative drug expired.11 To do otherwise would risk an infringement suit along
with attendant injunctions and monetary damages. Because the required generic
drug testing could only begin at the end of the innovative drug's patent term, patent
holding pharmaceutical companies maintained their exclusivity in the market well
beyond the expiration of the patent. 12 Thus, from the consumer's perspective, the
pre-1984 FDA regulations delayed access to inexpensive generic drugs.
In response to the unique delays the FDA approval process caused within the
pharmaceutical industry, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984 ("Hatch-Waxman Act").13 The Hatch-Waxman Act
primarily seeks to rectify the inequities in patent protection that resulted from the
15
federal regulatory process,1 4 and speed the entry of generic drugs into the market.

7 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring an inventor to disclose in a patent application "the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains... to make and use the same").
8 See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 261 62 (Aspen
Publishers 2003) (explaining that generic pharmaceutical companies would have to wait until the
patented drug's patent expired before they could begin accumulating the required FDA data, so the
patent holder would have extended market exclusivity).
9
See Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

10 See MUELLER, supra note 8, at 262.
1 See MUELLER, supra note 8, at 262.

12See MUELLER, supra note 8, at 262.
13 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585; see Amy Stark, The Exemption from PatentInfringement and DeclaratoryJudgments:
MisinterpretationofLegislative Intent?, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1057, 1060-63 (1994) (summarizing
the legislative intent of the Act).
1' George Fox, Intellectual Property: Note, Integra v. Merck.* Limiting the Scope of the
271(e)(1) Exception to PatentInfringement,19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 196 (2004). There are two
distortions in the patent term. Id. at 197. First, a new pharmaceutical company experiences a
"front end distortion," which is a period of time where no economic benefit is derived from a
pharmaceutical patent because the pharmaceutical is in the process of gaining regulatory approval.
Id. Second, the same patent owner will experience "back end distortion" of the patent term. Id.
This occurs when the patent on the pharmaceutical expires, but the market exclusivity continues
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It was codified in two parts: Part one restored to innovative pharmaceutical
companies some of the market exclusivity that was lost to FDA approval by granting
an extension of the patent term proportional to the time lost; part two, codified as
§ 271(e)(1), intended to expedite entry into the market by allowing generic drug
companies to manufacture and test their generic drug before the innovative drug's
patent term expired.16
Unfortunately, the text of the resulting legislation does not reflect this intent.
Instead of exempting the use of a patented drug, it exempts the use of "a patented
invention." 17 Also, rather than explicitly limiting the exemption for showing a drug's
safety and efficacy for FDA approval, the statute exempts infringing acts that are
"solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
...18
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.
The differences between the purported intent, which is specific, and the text of the
statute, which is not, led to numerous discussions concerning the proper scope of
§ 271(e)(1).19
In Integra Lifeseiences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA ("Merck IT), the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") limited application of the safe harbor
provision to clinical trials, which are human studies. 20 This decision sparked
controversy, because while clinical trials are often required to gain FDA approval of a

because generic companies need to gain regulatory approval before marketing the equivalent
pharmaceutical. Id.
1 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The
Federal Circuit identified two reasons for the Hatch-Waxman Act:
In the first place, the 1984 act sought to restore patent term to pharmaceutical
inventions to compensate for the often-lengthy period of pre-market testing
pending regulatory approval to sell a new pharmaceutical. These regulatory
delays can deprive a patentee of many years of its patent's term. The second
reason for the 1984 act responded to this court's decision in Roche Products, Inc.
v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.
Id. (citations omitted).
16 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(l), at 14-18 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
The Bill had two titles, each with a different purpose:
The purpose of Title I of the Bill is to make available more low cost generic
pharmaceuticals by establishing a generic pharmaceutical approval procedure for
pioneer pharmaceuticals first approved after 1962....
The purpose of Title II of the Bill is to create a new incentive for increased
expenditures for research and development of certain products which are subject
to premarket government approval. The incentive is the restoration of some of
the time lost on patent life while the product is awaiting pre-market approval.
Id.
17Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
19 See, e.g., Brian D. Coggio & Dominic Cerrito, The Safe Harbor Provision of the HatchWaxman Act.*PresentScope, New Possibilities,and InternationalConsiderations,57 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 161 (2002); Natalie M. Derzko, Article, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem
Arising from PatentingBiomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J.
347, 366-87 (2004) (discussing the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act in relation to the biotechnology
industry).
20 See Integra,331 F.3d at 866.
18
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generic drug, other types of research are often needed or desirable. Thus, this
21
narrow construction was contrary to the purpose of the exemption.
The U.S.S.C. granted certiorari to define the limits of the statute in Merck
KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. ("Merck IlI').22 However, instead of clarifying
the scope of the provision, the U.S.S.C. introduced more uncertainty when it
expanded the provision beyond mere testing of generic drugs to exempt infringing
activities during innovative drug research. 23 With many of the formerly defined
research boundaries of the exemption gone, it remains unclear under what
circumstances a § 271(e)(1) exemption will be granted. 24 Furthermore, such an
expansion could render all "research tool" 25 patents useless, 26 potentially violating
27
these patent owners' constitutional rights.
This comment focuses on the problems associated with the application of section
§ 271(e)(1) as interpreted by the U.S.S.C. in Merck II. Part I describes the general
process of bringing a drug to market, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and interpretations of
the Hatch-Waxman Act in the context of the Merck decisions. Part II analyzes the
legislative intent and policy issues surrounding the safe harbor provision, as well as
the new standard and limits of § 271(e)(1) in light of the Federal Circuit and the
U.S.S.C. interpretations. Part III proposes a narrower interpretation of § 271(e)(1)
which would avoid a regulatory taking of research tool patents and provide adequate
notice to scientific researchers concerning potentially infringing activities.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Drug Development andApproval Processes
The drug development approval process is costly and time consuming. 28 Drug
development has no set course prior to the FDA regulatory approval process, because
21 See Derzko, supra note 19, at 377-78; see also Gina C. Freschi, Comment, Navigating the
Researoh Exemption's Safe arhor: Supreme Court to Clariy Scope-Implications for Stem Cl
Resea-rch in California, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 855, 893 (2005).
22 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2376 (2005).
23 See id. at 2383.
24 See, e.g., Third Wave Tech., Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 891, 913 (W.D. Wis.
2005) (holding the court was "not convinced that a remote desire to obtain FDA approval for
products ... is sufficient to satisfy the 'reasonably related' standard.").
25 The National Institutes of Health ("NIH") defines research tools as "the full range of
resources that scientists use in the laboratory." NAT'L. INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NIH

WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (1998), http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/#backgrnd.
26 See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United

States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 955 (2004); Kevin Sandstrom, Note and Comment, HowMuch
Do We Value Researeh and Development?. Broadeningthe Experimental Use Exemption to Patent
Infringement in Light ofIntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed.Cir 2003),
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1059, 1105 (2004).
27
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The "Takings Clause" provides "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." Id.
28 See FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEPT. OF JUSTICE-ANTITRUST Div., supra note 4, at 4; Adams,

supra note 4, at 3.
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a candidate for a drug can be identified in several ways. A drug can be discovered in
a formal drug research process at a pharmaceutical company, 29 an informal manner
such as in the course of basic science research at a university or research
institution, 30 or even by accident. 31 Because of this variability, the type, quality, and
amount of data on a particular drug candidate gathered prior to its identification as a
potentially marketable drug varies greatly.
However, once an innovative drug candidate is identified as such, pursuant to
FDA regulations it is tested by research scientists, often at a pharmaceutical
company, to provide evidence of its safety and efficacy.3 2 The FDA approval process
requires a pharmaceutical company to file two different types of applications before
marketing a drug: Investigational New Drug Applications ("INDs") and New Drug
Applications ("NDAs"). 33 The INDs are filed before each of three phases of closely
monitored clinical trials required by the FDA for approval of a drug. 34 Each
application includes extensive data from previous in vitro or in vivo studies, which
may simply consist of the information gathered prior to the formal identification as a
35
potential drug candidate.
After the INDs are approved and clinical trials are completed, the
pharmaceutical company must file an NDA. 36 The NDA contains the data from the
clinical trials, as well as data from pre-clinical trials.3 7 The FDA examines this data,
and approves the drug for the market if the pharmaceutical company has sufficiently
demonstrated the drug is "safe and effective."38 Gaining approval for a new drug
2) See, e.g., Matthew J. Plunkett & Jonathan A. Eliman, CombinatorialChemistry and New
Drugs, Sm. AM. Apr. 1997, at 68 (describing combinatorial chemistry as a method for drug
discovery).
30 Basic science research is defined by the American Cancer Society as "laboratory studies that
are not aimed at specific problems, but that provide the necessary knowledge and background for
later applied research."
American Cancer Society Glossary-Basic Science Research,
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/GRY/GRY_0.asp?dictionary=&pagKey=B (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
31 E.g., Sir Alexander Fleming, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 11, 1945), in FROM NOBEL LECTURES,
PHYSIOLOGY OR MEDICINE 1942-1962 (Elsevier Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1964). One famous
example is the discovery of penicillin, which was serendipitously discovered by Alexander Fleming
in 1928. id. Fleming noticed that mold that had grown on a dirty agar plate appeared to inhibit
staphylococcal growth. Id. This mold, penicillin, is an antibiotic still used today.
32 24 C.F.R. § 314.2 (2005). Pharmaceuticals will be approved when shown to be "safe and
effective." Id.
' 3 21 C.F.R § 312.20(a) (2005). "A sponsor shall submit an IND to FDA if the sponsor intends
to conduct a clinical investigation with an investigational new pharmaceutical that is subject to
§ 312.2(a)." Id.
M Id. § 314.21(a)-(c). "An IND may be submitted for one or more phases of an investigation."
Id. Phase I studies are closely monitored small scale human studies "to determine the metabolism
and pharmacologic actions of the pharmaceutical in humans, the side effects associated with
increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness." Id. § 314.21(a). Phase II
studies the "effectiveness of the pharmaceutical ... the common short-term side effects and risks
associated with the pharmaceutical." Id. § 314.21(b). Phase III studies are large scale studies "to
gather the additional information about effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the
overall benefit-risk relationship of the pharmaceutical and to provide an adequate basis for
physician labeling." Id. § 314.21(c).
3 See generallyid. § 314.50
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. § 314.105(c).
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after submission of an NDA takes between one and two years,3 9 and the approval
time of INDs varies greatly.40 Because pharmaceutical patent applications are
typically filed prior to filing an IND, the innovative pharmaceutical company, prior to
the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, lost a substantial period of market
41
exclusivity granted by the patent.
Generic drugs, although seemingly equivalent to their innovative drug
counterparts, can only gain FDA approval if they are shown safe and effective by the
generic pharmaceutical company. 42 Because innovative drug companies typically
hold patents on their drugs, prior to 1984 the manufacture and testing of generic
equivalents of these drugs pursuant to FDA approval before the expiration of the
patent was an act of infringement. 43 This effectively extended the patent holder's
market exclusivity to include the time needed for the generic drug company to gain
FDA approval. 44 Thus, innovative drug companies experienced a delay of entry into
the market at the beginning of the patent term, but an addition to market exclusivity
45
at the end of the patent term.
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to rectify the distortion of the
patent term of innovative drugs and help speed the entry of generic drugs into the
market. 46 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides generic pharmaceutical companies with
an abbreviated approval process whereby some tests already performed by the
innovative drug companies are not required 47 as well as a statutory exemption from
patent infringement in pursuit of FDA approval. 48 Because of this exemption, upon
the expiration of the innovative drug's patent term, the equivalent generic drug

'3 U.S. FDA CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA's DRUG REVIEW AND
APPROVAL TIMES (2001), http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/reviewtimes/default.htm
(stating FDA
approval time was reported as sixteen months in 2000, including "FDA review time for the first
submission of an NDA to the Agency, plus any subsequent time during which a pharmaceutical
sponsor addresses deficiencies in the NDA and resubmits the application, plus subsequent FDA
review time").
40See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.21(a), 312.23(a)(5)(iii) (indicating the experimental conditions required
for approval will vary with each drug, and the amount of information required will also vary).
41MUELLER, supra note 8, at 262. While it is not mandatory to file the patent application in
any particular phase of the regulatory approval process, an inventor typically files a patent
application as soon as he is able to do so. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
A rival company could copy or independently invent the same drug. Failure to file a patent
application early not only exposes the company to an increased risk of competition in the market,
but also a potential bar from the use of his own invention if a year lapses since the invention date, or
a rival company files a patent application first. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (describing the "statutory
bars" to patentability of an invention).
42 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a).
43 MUELLER, supra note 8, at 262.
4 MUELLER, supra note 8, at 262.
45 EliLilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 669 70.
46 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
47 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). The Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") requires that
the generic company demonstrate the pharmaceutical is "bio-equivalent" to the patented
pharmaceutical. Id. This allows the researcher to bypass many clinical and pre-clinical studies
performed pursuant to the patented pharmaceutical's IND and NDA. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I),
at 14-18 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
4835 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). The Act allows innovative pharmaceutical companies to extend
their patent term to compensate for time lost in the approval process. Id. § 156(c).
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would already be tested and approved by the FDA, and could immediately the
market.

B. The Hatch-Waxman Act and Section 271(e)(1)
The Hatch-Waxman Act appears in different sections of the United States
Code, 49 but the portion of the Hatch-Waxman Act that protects generic drug
companies from infringement during testing was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
This section states that it is not infringement to use a "patented invention ... solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information" under
a regulatory federal law. 50 According to House Reports, the intent in passing this
provision was to allow the research and testing needed for FDA approval to
commence before the expiration of the innovative drug's patent term, so that upon
expiration of the patent, the public would immediately have access to generic drugs,
which are typically less costly than innovative drugs. 51 However, the plain text of the
52
statute does not specifically mention drugs or the FDA approval process.
In Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, the U.S.S.C. expanded the scope of the statutory safe
harbor provision beyond the realm of generic drugs. 53 This case applied § 271(e)(1) to
the testing of a cardiac defibrillator, a medical device, 54 because such devices, like
drugs, are subject to extensive federal regulation. 55 When trying to follow Eli Lilly,
courts generally continued to interpret the statute broadly; however, some
inconsistencies developed in defining the specific "patented inventions" exempted
from infringement by § 271(e)(), 56 as well as the permissible uses of these

4 Id. §§ 156(c), 271(e)(1).
5oId. § 271(e)(1).
51 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(), at 14-18, reprintedin1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647-48.
52 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
5
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (expanding the scope of
§ 271(e)(1) to include the testing of medical devices).
5 Id. at 664. A medical device subject to regulation under the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act,
and the basis of the U.S.S.C.'s finding is that the Patent Act classifies a medical device as a "human
drug product," thus falling within the statutory text of § 271(e)(1). Id. at 671 (referring to 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(f)).
5 Id. at 674.
56 Comparo Infigen Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. 967, 980 (W.D. Wis. 1999)
(declining to extend § 271(e)(1) to protect use of method and patented cell medium, stating "[m]y
own research shows no cases granting the § 271(e)(1) exemption from the otherwise infringing use of
any product other than those pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food and color additives defined
specified in [35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000)]."), and Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 798 F.
Supp. 612, 620 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (testing of class I and class II medical devices is not protected by
§ 271(e)(1) because they have a shorter regulatory review period than class III devices), with Abtox,
Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d. 1019, 1030 (Mass. 1997) (holding the safe harbor provision of
§ 271(e)(1) does apply to class II medical devices).
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inventions. 57 The debate came to a head in Telios Pharmaceuticalsv. Merck KGaA
("Merck J'). 5S

C. The Merck Cases
In the Merck line of cases, the scope of § 271(e)(1) was again called into
question. 59 A California District Court, the Federal Circuit, and the U.S.S.C. faced
several new issues in interpreting the statute, as the statutory text did not indicate
whether the scope of § 271(e)(1) should extend to activities related to new drug
60
development.
In Merck , the defendants, Merck KGaA ("Merck"), Dr. Cheresh, and the
Scripps Research Institute, raised § 271(e)(1) as a defense to their infringing use of a
particular tri-peptide that they believed to be a good candidate for a new drug.6 1 The
tri-peptide, patented by the plaintiff Telios Pharmaceuticals ("Telios") and later
purchased by Integra Lifesciences Corporation ("Integra"), was known to bind to
specific cellular receptors and promote cellular adhesion. 62 However, Telios, a small
biotechnology company, did not file an IND because it was unable to find a
63
potentially marketable use for their compound.
Dr. Cheresh, an angiogenesis scientist at Scripps, discovered it was possible to
inhibit tumor growth by binding a compound to the same cellular receptors bound by
the patented Telios tri-peptide.6 4 Merck and Dr. Cheresh collaborated to develop an
anti-tumor drug using tri-peptides that purportedly infringed Telios' patent. 65 Dr.
Cheresh screened several similar tri-peptides for anti-tumor activity, and found a
promising drug candidate. 66 Merck planned to proceed with the regulatory approval
67
process.

57 See

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 02-1280, 2001 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 19361, at *27-28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001) (holding § 271(e)(1) can be applied to use of

patented drug intermediates in generic development process); see also Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v.
AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197, 205 (D. Del. 2002) (holding the use of patented antibodies to
develop a cell-separating device pursuant to FDA approval fell within scope of § 271(e)(1)).
5S Telios Pharms., Inc. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96-CV-1307 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1997) afd, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) rev, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2376 (2005).
59 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2372, 2376 (2005).
(3oId.
(31TohOs, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at *6.
62 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Integra
purchased U.S. Patent Nos. 4,988,621, 4,792,525, 5,695,997, 4,879,237, and 4,789,734 related to the
"RGD peptide" from Telios. Id. at 862.
63 Id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting).
14Id. at 863.

3"Id.

(3c,
Id.
(7 Id. (stating "Merck then entered into an agreement with Scripps to fund the 'necessary
experiments' to satisfy biological bases and regulatory (FDA) requirements for the implementation
of clinical trials").
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As Merck began discussions with the FDA prior to filing an IND, Integra sued
Merck, Dr. Cheresh, and Scripps for infringement. 68
The defendants raised
§ 271(e)(1) as a defense to infringement. 69 The § 271(e)(1) defense, if applied to this
case, would broaden the scope of the statute, because the patented invention used by
Dr. Cheresh was not tested for use as a generic drug, but as an innovative drug.70 On
a motion for partial summary judgment, the California District Court in Merck I,
citing Eli Lilly, held that the type of invention used was irrelevant; instead the court
focused on whether the information gathered was "solely for uses reasonably related
to" FDA approval, holding the exemption may apply because some of the infringing
use was aimed at drug research, albeit for an innovative drug rather than a generic
drug.7 1 The District Court, however, limited the scope of permissible activities to
those "solely" required for FDA approval, and held that a factual determination of the
stage of research was needed to determine whether the provision would apply.7 2 On
appeal to the Federal Circuit, following a jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor, Merck
73
argued that the District Court's interpretation of § 271(e)(1) was incorrect.
The Federal Circuit examined the statute in the context of its legislative history
to define its proper scope.74 In Merck I, the Federal Circuit expressed concern that
expanding the scope of the statute to cover activities in new drug development would
adversely affect biotechnology patent owners' rights.7 5 The Federal Circuit read the
statutory text, in particular the word "solely," as a limitation on the scope of the
allowable infringing activities. 76 Relying on the legislative history, the Federal
Circuit held that the exemption would not apply to activities in Merck I, because the
research was not specifically geared toward FDA approval. 77 The Federal Circuit
also suggested that the exemption should only be applied in cases where the subject
of study was an already approved drug or medical device.78 The Federal Circuit
upheld the verdict in favor of Integra, 79 and Merck appealed to the U.S.S.C.80
68 Id.
Integra also filed suit against Dr. Cheresh and Scripps. Id. The defendants claimed the
experimental use exemption in addition to § 271(e)(1). Id.
Eventually, the suits against Dr.
Cheresh and Scripps were dismissed. Id.
69 Id. The defendants also raised the experimental use defense, however the jury was not
instructed on that defense, nor did the Federal Circuit consider the issue on appeal. Id. at 864.
70 Soo Telios Pharms., Inc. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96-CV-1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at
*6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1997). However, this question was not entirely novel, as the court noted in

Tehios, as one other district granted the exemption for the filing of an IND. Id at *10 (citing, NeoRX
Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 204 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding infringing activities
performed in pursuit of a new drug application were exempt under § 271(e)(1))). Id.at *7.
71 Id.at *14.
72 Id. at *18.
73Integra, 331 F.3d at 864.
74 Id.at 865 (citing the House Committee's characterization of the scope of the provision in
H.R.REP No. 98-857(11), at 8 (1984) reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2692, 2714 ("all that the generic
can do is test the pharmaceutical for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval")).
7, Id.at 867 (stating "expansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps-Merck activities would
effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool patents").
76Id. at 866.
77Id.at 867.
78

Id. at 866.

79Id.at 868. Judge Newman dissented, claiming either the common law experimental use
exception or the § 271(e)(1) should apply, but did not discuss where the boundary might lie. Id. at

877. The dissent noted that § 271(e)(1) should not extend to innovative drug research. -,d
80 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
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In Merck III the U.S.S.C. attempted, for the second time, to establish
parameters for the scope of the statutory safe harbor provision. 8 ' The U.S.S.C.
8 2
examined the issue in a different and broader light, focusing on text of the statute.
The U.S.S.C. decision answered two questions: First, what "patented invention" may
be used by experimenters to qualify for the § 271(e)(1) exemption; second, what uses
83
of this invention would be "solely for uses reasonably related" to FDA approval.
The U.S.S.C. in Merck III referenced the plain text of the statute, which was silent
84
on both matters.
85
The U.S.S.C. had previously examined this portion of the statute in Eli Lilly.
In that case, the patented invention was a medical device. 8 6 The Court relied on the
definition of the term "invention" provided in 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) in holding "the
phrase 'patented invention' in § 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug
related inventions alone."87 The U.S.S.C. had not yet contemplated the possibility of
inventions that could be considered "research tools" because the invention in that
88
case did not qualify as a research tool.
In Merck III the U.S.S.C. held that all information relevant to filing an IND
would fall within the statute's scope, including information discovered in the course
of new drug development.8 9 The U.S.S.C. also held that a "patented invention" could
include a compound that is not actually submitted to the FDA for approval. 90 Thus,
the Court overturned Merck II and held that Scripps' and Merck's activities were
exempt under § 271(e)(1).91 However, the U.S.S.C. did not address whether these
inventions, which may be used without liability for infringement, included research
tools 92

SI Id. at 2376.
82 See id. at 2380 84. The U.S.S.C. began the analysis of the scope of the statute by referring

to the text, stating "we think it is apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)'s exemption from
infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the
development and submission of any information under the FDCA." Id. at 2380.
83 Id. at 2376.
81 Id. at 2380.
85 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
86-Tfd
87 Id.

The court cited 35 U.S.C. § 100(a), which states "[w]hen used in this title unless the
context otherwise indicates ... the term 'invention' means invention or discovery". 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(a) (2000).
88 See Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 665. Medtronic sought an injunction to prevent Eli Lilly
from testing and marketing a cardiac defibrillator. Id. at 664. The U.S.S.C. found that Eli Lilly's
activities were analogous to the testing of a generic drug, because the device was subject to a
similarly rigorous regulatory approval process, and the goal of the infringing use was to gain such
approval. Id. at 674.
89 Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2380. (holding "there is simply no room in the statute for excluding
certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed
or the particular submission in which it could be included.")
90 Id. at 2382.
The court stated "§ 271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement [does not]
categorically exclude either (1) experimentation on pharmaceuticals that are not ultimately the
subject of an FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in experiments that are not
ultimately submitted to the FDA." Id. at 2380 n.7.
91 Id. at 2383.
92 See id. The U.S.S.C. did note the Federal Circuit's concern with the matter of research tools
patents, but stated that the matter was not before the Court. Id. The U.S.S.C. declined to rule on
whether the use of research tools would fall within the scope of the exemption because neither party
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D. PatentRights and PropertyRights
Patent rights are based in the United States Constitution, which gives Congress
93
power to grant limited monopolies to promote the "[p]rogress of ... useful [a]rts."
The earliest patent statute was enacted in 1790. 94 Since their enactment, patent
96
laws have been revised several times, 95 and are presently undergoing reform.
The constitutional goal of promoting progress is met by the two primary
purposes of the patent system: providing incentive to invent, and granting the
information to the public as soon as possible. 97 A patent accomplishes these goals by
conferring to the holder the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
98
invention for a limited period of time.

It is not novel to balance patent or property rights against strong competing
public policies. 99 In 1813, Justice Story created an exemption to patent infringement,
whereby he permitted strictly "philosophical experiments" with patented
inventions. 100 This experimental use exemption as a defense to infringement still
exists today, but in an extremely limited form. 10 1
Although intellectual property, including patents, is not typically subject to the
same rules as real or personal property, the modern view is that the right to exclude
others conferred by a patent is a property right. 10 2 As a property right, the right to
exclude others from making, using, and selling a patented invention is protected by
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that "private

claimed the patented compound in question was a research tool. Id. The court further stated that
based on the record, the compounds were not research tools. Id.
93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries." 1d. This clause has been termed "both a grant of power and a limitation." Graham v.
John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1966).
94 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2 (2004). The earliest statute granted patents
for inventions including "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device or any
improvement therein" that were previously unknown, and "sufficiently useful and important." Id.
951Id. §§ 2-3 (2004) (providing a historical synopsis of patent laws).
96 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. See gcnerally Steven R. Ludwig, The
Most Comprehensive Change to US. Patent Law, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July, 2005, at 8
(summarizing proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005).
97 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
These two aspects of the
patent system have been studied in detail. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress
of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-30 (1989)
(discussing the incentive to invent and incentive to disclose theories).
98 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2) (2000). An invention must meet certain requirements before a
patent can be obtained. Id. §§ 101-103.
99 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
100 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (1813). Justice Story created the experimental
use exception by stating "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man
who constructed such a machine for philosophical experiments." Id
101 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (refusing to grant the exception
to a University that used a patented invention for basic research, reasoning that the use was not
purely philosophical because research furthered the institution's business). The Federal Circuit
reframed the limits of the exemption to exclude any activities that further the infringer's "legitimate
business." Id.
102 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002).

[5:216 20061

Incorrectly Expanded 271(e)(1)

property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' 10 3 A
regulatory taking occurs when governmental regulation either "takes" the entire
property right, or so substantially deprives an owner of his property rights that the
property can be considered "taken."10 4 Whether a taking has occurred is typically
determined by applying the Penn Central balancing test, which considers three
factors: one, the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner; two, the
character of the governmental regulatory action; and three, the extent the regulation
interferes with reasonable "investment-backed expectations." 105
The so called "takings clause" was first applied to intellectual property, as
opposed to real or private property, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. In that case, the
U.S.S.C. held that trade secrets were a property right that should be protected by the
Fifth Amendment. 10 6 While the idea of applying the takings clause to intellectual
property is still relatively new, Congress acknowledged that the takings doctrine
would apply to patents in the debates over the Hatch-Waxman Act, but concluded
107
that the very limited use intended by lawmakers would not constitute a taking.
However, in reaching this conclusion, Congress had merely contemplated the very
limited case of allowing a generic drug already being tested to show equivalence to an
innovative drug as required by the FDA, and did not contemplate the provision being
applied to the search for new drugs.

II. ANALYSIS
Part A of this section analyzes the underlying policy considerations and
legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part A also discusses the interplay
between patent policy and policies of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and analyzes the
changing role of legislative history in courts' interpretation of the statute. Next, Part
B considers the scope of § 271(e)(1) following Merck IIL Last, Part C examines the
potential constitutional problems associated with the new scope of § 271(e)(1).

A. Policy ConsiderationsandLegislative History

1. The Relationship Between PatentPoliciesand Drug Policies
Before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA's goal of providing
safe and effective drugs 10 8 conflicted with the policies promoted by the patent

103 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The "Takings Clause" provides "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation." Id. The takings clause is applicable to intellectual
property. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
104 See Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
105 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
10
6 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
107 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(11), at 29-30 (1984), reprintedin1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2713-14.
108 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(11), at 9, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2693. The stated policy
objective of the Act was to expedite the entry of generic substitutes in the market. Id.
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system. 10 9 The FDA approval process substantially shortened the useful term of the
patent, and required significant financial expenditures. 110
This shortening
negatively affected the financial benefits provided by U.S. patent laws to innovative
pharmaceutical companies, and threatened to discourage innovation.1 1 Additionally,
the pre-1984 FDA regulations adversely affected the second stated purpose of patent
law, 112 providing the public with immediate knowledge but delayed use of the
invention. 113 While the public continued to have access to the innovative drugs, the
public did not have the full power to use the information disclosed in the patent to
produce low cost equivalents as soon as the patent term expired. The innovative
drug companies' period of market exclusivity continued pending FDA approval of
equivalent generic drugs. These considerations drove Congress to pass the HatchWaxman Act. 114 Congress recognized the need to grant the public the immediate
benefit of low cost drugs.
Many courts that have attempted to define the scope of § 271(e)(1) have also
recognized the need to balance these competing interests. 115 In Merck , the court
emphasized the need to preserve patent holders' rights, which resulted in a very
narrow interpretation of the statute.11 6 In contrast, the U.S.S.C. in Merck Illfocused
little on patent holders' rights, and emphasized the need to provide a broad
117
exemption to further the goals of encouraging pharmaceutical development.

2. The Courtq"View of Legislative Hitory
The Congressional reports related to the enactment of § 271(e)(1) clearly state
that a primary purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to provide the public with
increased access to generic drugs.118 This goal is accomplished by abolishing the
effective term extension enjoyed by pharmaceutical patent owners due to the generic
drug regulatory approval period.11 9 Further policy rationale can be inferred from the
original title of the Act, the "Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
1 20
Act," which identifies the intent to provide competitive pricing for drugs.
In Merck H, the Federal Circuit revisited the Act's legislative history in greater
depth. 121 The Federal Circuit focused on phrases in the legislative history that

'09 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
10 Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The court
acknowledged "the remaining effective life of patent protection assertedly may be as low as 7 years."
Id.
I Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480 81.
112 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(1), at 9, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2693.
"13 Kewanee 0i, 416 U.S. at 480-81.
1H H.R. REP. No. 98-857(I) at 14-15, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647 48.
'15 See generallyMerck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
116 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 68 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
117 See Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
118 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14-15, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647 48.
119

ITd.

120

Id. at 1, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647.
See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

121

Incorrectly Expanded 271(e)(1)

[5:216 20061

promoted a narrower view, thus restricting the scope of the statute. 122 The Federal
Circuit held that an extension of § 271(e)(1) to activities associated with new drug
123
development would ignore the text and purpose of the Act.
In Merck II, Justice Scalia did not consider the legislative history in his
interpretation of the statute. 124 This is not surprising, given his analysis of
§ 271(e)(1) in the earlier Eli Lilly decision, where he stated that the statute was
poorly written, and that the legislative history did not clarify the proper scope. 125 As
a result, the Court held that § 271(e)(1) could apply to activities associated with
126
development of a new drug.

B. The New Scope of the Safe HarborProvision
The U.S.S.C.'s definition of the scope of § 271(e)(1) is extremely broad because
the U.S.S.C. did not specifically exclude the use of any particular type of drug from
the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1).127 Indeed, rather than defining the scope of the
provision in terms of the type of invention that may be used, the sole limitation
imposed by the U.S.S.C. is based on the use of the patented invention.1 28 Moreover,
the U.S.S.C. broadened the scope of such permissible uses.1 29 The statute now
exempts the use of any patented compounds in preclinical studies and clinical
studies, provided the experiments may produce the "types of information that are
''1
relevant to an 'IND or NDA. 30
According to Merck II, innovative drug companies can now use any patented
inventions in the search for new drug candidates without fear of an infringement
suit. 13 1 The U.S.S.C.'s broad interpretation of the term "invention" ignored the
warnings of the Federal Circuit about the potentially devastating effect of a broad
interpretation of the statute on holders of biotechnology patents. 13 2 Included among
such patented biotechnology inventions are "research tools," which are inventions
1 33
that aid in research.

122

Soo id. at 865. Specifically, the court focused on the Committe's description of appropriate

pre-market activity as "a limited amount of testing so that generic companies can establish the
bioequivalency of a generic substitute." Id. The Court also considered the Committe's statement
that the "nature of the interference with the rights of the patent holder" would not be "substantial,"
but "de minimus." Id.
123

See id.at 866.

Seo Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990) (stating the statute was "not
plainly comprehensible on anyone's view").
126 Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383.
127 Id. (substituting "patented compound" for the term "patented invention" found in the text of
124

125

the statute).
128
129

See id. at 2383.
See id. at 2383.

130 Id. at 2383 84 (quoting the Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 15, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237)).
131

See id. at 2382.

Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 872 n.4. The Federal Circuit deferred to the National Institute of Health ("NIH")
definition of research tools: "tools that scientists use in the laboratory, including cell lines,
132
133
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The U.S.S.C. additionally expanded the scope of § 271(e)(1) by altering the
" 134
Federal Circuit's interpretation of the phrase "solely for uses reasonably related.
The word "solely" has received inconsistent treatment in the courts, but when
included in the interpretation, it is most often read to exclude activities that may
have collateral purposes. 13 5 The U.S.S.C. did not include the term "solely" at all in
136
the analysis in Merck III, nor did it expressly address the reason for its exclusion.
This omission implies that uses of patented inventions other than those "solely" for
FDA approval are allowable under the exemption, and that the boundaries of the
provision are simply imposed by the term "reasonably related." 13 7 Indeed, the
138
U.S.S.C.'s focus was the definition of the "reasonably related" standard.
The U.S.S.C.'s holding that "any information" is relevant to the FDA, including
all information related to an IND, imposes no boundaries on the scope of the
statute. 139 Because the FDA does not exclude any information from submission, and
requires a broad scope of information before clinical trials can begin, no data would
ever be excluded under this reasoning. 140 Therefore, any information pertaining to a
compound under investigation would be relevant. Given the U.S.S.C.'s broad
treatment of the word "information" and neglect of the word "solely," any boundaries
of § 271(e)(1) are necessarily imposed by the phrase "for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission" of information under the FDA, a much broader
141
standard than contemplated in Merck I]or by Congress.
The U.S.S.C. expressly stated that there is no basis for excluding information
based on the phase of research, but in the end imposed its sole limitation on that very
basis. 1 42 The only guidance given by the U.S.S.C. in the interpretation of the scope of
§ 271(e)(1) is that basic science research is too remote, and that a reasonable relation
monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA
libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines." Td.
131Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2383.
135 COmpa-re Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396 (D.
Cal. 1987) (declining to extend protection to tests by infringer that had "some reasonable
relationship" to FDA approval because text should be interpreted to mean "solely" related to FDA
approval), andBiogen, Inc. v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (Mass. 1996) (declaring no safe
harbor because "Biogen had done far more than merely do clinical trials for submission to the
FDA"), with Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d. 1019, 1030 (holding text of 271(e)(1) should be
interpreted as "reasonably related to FDA approval"), and Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating the appropriate analysis is to question whether it was
reasonable for the defendant to believe "there was a decent prospect that the 'use' in question would
contribute (relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be
relevant in the processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product"), and
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding the
exemption should apply when there are "reasonable prospects of yielding information that might be
relevant in the FDA approval process").
1:36Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383. The court states "[the statute] exempted from infringement all
uses of patented compounds 'reasonably related' to the process of developing information." Id. The
word "solely" is left out of the analysis entirely. Id.
1:37Id.
138
139

Id.
Id. at 2380 (emphasis in original).

140 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(a)(A) (2000). The statute requires reports of all studies aimed at
showing safety or efficacy of a pharmaceutical. Td.
141 Seo M rck, 125 S. Ct. at 2380.
142 Id.at 2380.
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should be determined by the intent of the research. 143 Unfortunately, scientific
research is not divided into drug producing activities and non-drug producing
activities, and the definition of "basic science" is very broad. 144 There is no set route
to drug research, and some of the most useful drugs were serendipitous
discoveries. 145 Despite frequent attempts to formalize the drug research process,
innovative pharmaceutical companies often collaborate and fund basic science
research to increase the odds of finding a viable drug. 146 Many basic scientists begin
their research with the goal of understanding a physiological process, but often the
process under investigation is the onset of a disease. 147 It is difficult to imagine
finding a researcher who studies cancer, for example, that would admit to having no
intent to discover a cure. 148 Even if such a researcher were to exist, what if he were
told that the intent to develop a drug would allow him exemptions on patent
infringement? An exemption to patent infringement that includes the "hunt for new
drugs" gives anyone a free use of a patented invention under the guise of
experimentation.

C. ConstitutionalRamifications of the Merck Cases
Because Congress considered the possibility of a regulatory taking when it
enacted § 271(e)(1), it is desirable to revisit this analysis in light of the Merck
holdings. 149 The possible degree of invasion of a patent holder's property rights
under § 271(e)(1) can be viewed as a spectrum, with the generic drug patent holders
on one end, research tool patent holders on the other end, and Telios (the plaintiff in
the Merck cases) somewhere in the middle.
When Congress declared that § 271(e)(1) was constitutional under the takings
clause, it applied the Penn Central analysis to the limited scenario intended by the
statute. 150 The benefit that Congress deemed substantial, the reduced cost of drugs
because of increased availability of generic drugs, was balanced against a "de
minimus" interference of the patent holders' rights, stating "all the generic can do is
test the drug for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval." 151 Such a
benefit outweighed the interference and hence, was declared constitutional.
143 Id. at 2382 (excluding "basic science research ... performed without intent to develop a
particular pharmaceutical or a reasonable belief that the compound will cause an intended
physiological effect").
144 See American Cancer Society Glossary, supra note 30.
115See, e.g., Fleming, supranote 31.
146 See, e.g., Merek, 125 S. Ct. at 2377-78. Dr. Cheresh was a researcher at Scripps that
studied a physiological process, angiogenesis, who entered into a collaboration with Merck to
attempt to find a viable drug candidate. Id.
147 See Joseph Coates, Where Science Is Headed-Sixteen Trends, J. OF THE WASH. ACAD. OF
SCI., Fall-Winter 2003, at 1. Trends in basic science research are closely tied to funding sources,
which often require statements of potential benefits of the proposed research. Id.
148 See Peter D. Goldsworthy & Alexander C. McFarlane, Howard Florey, Alexander Fleming
and the Fairy Tale of Penieilhn, 176 MED. J. OF AUSTL. 176, 180 (2002) (quoting the philosopher R.
Rorty, who said "inquiry is never pure ... it is always a matter of getting us something we want").
149 H.R.REP. No. 98-857(11) at 27 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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Considering the broad scope of the statute after the Merck Iff decision, the same
constitutional analysis leads to a different result when considering research tools.
Judge Newman stated in Merck II, "[t]he use of an existing tool in one's research is
quite different from the study of the tool itself."152 However, for some inventions,
specifically research tools, the use of the invention as a tool is the invention's only
purpose. 153 For example, an invention that uses a test tube and a set of reagents to
measure the decomposition rate of a drug in the body would significantly reduce the
need for animal and human testing. 154 This invention would be of great value to
innovative pharmaceutical researchers. If the inventor seeks a patent for his biodegradability test, the method of performing such tests would be disclosed and could
be duplicated by anyone with access to the reagents.1 55 Under the current scope of
§ 271(e)(1), a pharmaceutical company could manufacture and use the patented test
under the guise of looking for new drugs, based on the description in the patent,
without fear of an infringement lawsuit.
Applying the Penn Central analysis to the above hypothetical, it is clear that a
regulatory taking has occurred. First, it can be assumed that such an inventor would
have a distinct investment-backed expectation, as the inventor would likely market
the invention toward pharmaceutical companies. Second, considering the nature of
the government interference, allowing such a tool to fall within the scope of
§ 271(e)(1) deprives the patent owner of his only property right. 156 Finally, these
factors must be balanced against the benefits to the public of potentially inexpensive
drugs, not to mention the lives of many laboratory animals. These benefits may tip
the scales in favor of allowing the exemption, however the nearly complete
deprivation of intellectual property is a substantial detriment to the "need to
stimulate innovation."15 7 In the above hypothetical, the inventor would either sue
the government and recover a reasonable royalty for his invention or be left empty

Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See Janice M. Mueller, Article."No "DilettanteAffair": Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001)
(defining research tools as "the many varied resources used by scientists to conduct research and
development of new pharmaceuticals, therapies, diagnostic methods, and other therapeutic
products"). In some instances, the sole purpose of a research tool is to assist researchers in the
study of a compound. Id.
15 INDs and NDAs require data that establish biological decomposition rates.
21 C.F.R.
§ 312.23 (2005). Thus, the use of such an invention would lead to information "reasonably" related
to FDA approval of a drug.
155 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Section 112 requires an inventor to disclose in a patent application
"the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same."
Id.
156 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (applying the takings
clause to intellectual property rights). For intellectual property the right to exclude is the property
right. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002). If this right is
effectively removed by a governmental regulation, a taking has occurred. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S.
at 1003-04. See generally Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Artiele: Medical Method Patents and the
Fifth Amendment. Do the New Limits on EnforceabilityEffect a Taking?, 4. U. BALT. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 147, 165-77 (1996) (discussing the application of the takings clause to regulations of medical
method patents).
157 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(11), at 30, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
152

153
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handed. 158 However, this scenario places a significant burden on the inventor of a
research tool, as he would be required to file suit and prove the damages he incurred.
In the Merck line of cases, the Penn Central analysis leads to an uncertain
result. It is not as clear what Telios' investment-backed expectation would be,
because Telios was unable to find a productive use for the tri-peptide other than
selling the patent that covered the peptide to Integra. However, for a small
biotechnology company, this may well be a significant investment-backed
expectation. It is reasonable, in any case, to assume that such companies set out
with some expectation of a profit. Second, it is also difficult to determine the extent
of the invasion of Telios' property right. The patent holder in the Merck line of cases
did not lose the right to exclusively sell its invention, but rather lost the right to its
exclusive use. 159 If Merck had managed to gain FDA approval for the tri-peptide,
nothing in § 271(e)(1) gives Merck the right to sell it. At most, § 271(e)(1) diminished
the value of the patents, because of lost licensing opportunities. 160
The third Penn
Centralfactor as applied to the Merck line of cases would substantially outweigh any
detriment to the patent holder, because the new use of the tri-peptide as an antitumor drug would be a significant benefit to society. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to predict whether a court would hold that a taking has occurred. If there is
a taking, the "just compensation" that should be paid would also be great, given the
compounds potential role as an anti-tumor agent. It is apparent that for uses falling
between the two ends of § 271(e)(1)'s spectrum, whether a taking has occurred will
require a case by case basis analysis of Penn Central'sfactors.

III. PROPOSAL
The current scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act, as defined by the U.S.S.C., is broad
and uncertain.1 61 To maintain the current goals of our patent system, it is important
to protect the patent owners' right to exclude when possible and avoid creating
inconsistent exemptions to infringement. 162 This comment proposes a narrow
interpretation of the safe harbor provision, limiting the scope of § 271(e)(1) to the use
of a patented drug or device solely to show equivalence for FDA approval.

158 See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003 04.
159 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005) (holding the

infinging activities fell within the statutory safe harbor, therefore the patent holder lost the right to
the exclusive use of his invention).
1 0
6 See Telios Pharms., Inc. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96CV1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at
*11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1997).
161See Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383 (holding § 271(e)(1) applies to any invention, not merely the
subject of study, as long as the research will reasonably lead to information of interest to the FDA
for approval of a drug). The U.S.S.C. acknowledged that almost all information in the course of
research on a particular compound would be reasonably included. Id. at 2382. The only limitation
imposed by the U.S.S.C. was the exclusion of basic science research on the grounds that the intent to
develop a drug was absent. Id.
1 2 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 81 (1974).
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A. Limit 'Invention" to Subject ofStudy
In Merck III, the U.S.S.C. improperly declined to limit the "invention" that
would be infringed to the subject of study.1 63 This interpretation is not only contrary
to the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 164 it also may render research tool patents
worthless, 165 leading to a regulatory taking. 166 Allowing § 271(e)(1) to apply to
inventions that are not the subject of study does not further the goals of the HatchWaxman Act. 167 Certainly, there is a great advantage to innovative pharmaceutical
companies if § 271(e)(1) is broadly interpreted, because they could use any patented
invention without fear of infringement litigation. 168 However, although this would
lower expenditures of pharmaceutical companies in their endeavors to discover new
drugs, this would not necessarily translate to cheaper drugs for consumers.
Furthermore, any cost saved by an innovative pharmaceutical company would be
transferred either to the government, as the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation to be paid in the case of a taking, or to inventors as they lose the
opportunity to license their patented inventions. 169 Moreover, there is no patent
term distortion when the patented invention is not the subject of study because there
is no FDA-approval-based delay of the patent term. 170 It is also unlikely that this
1 71
expansion would result in earlier entry of generic drugs into the market.
Furthermore, expanding the scope of the exemption to include inventions that
are not the subject of study is contrary to the goals of the patent system. Taking
away licensing opportunities for any product that may be used in the course of drug
research deters, rather than encourages innovation. It is difficult to imagine why
any biotechnology company would invest in the development of new research tools
with the probability of gaining no return on their investment. There is no benefit to
disclosing the invention without the guarantee of exclusivity, and this may begin to
163 Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383.
164 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(), at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
The committee stated that an unconstitutional taking was not present because "the only activity
which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that generic companies can
establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute." H.R.REP.No. 98-857(11), at 30, reprintedin
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
165 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
100 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The "takings clause" provides "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." Id. The takings clause is applicable to intellectual
property. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding trade-secrets to
be a property right that should be protected by the Fifth Amendment). A regulatory taking occurs
when a governmental regulation extensively reduces a property right. Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). Congress acknowledged that the takings doctrine would apply to the
Hatch-Waxman Act, but concluded that the very limited use contemplated would not constitute a
taking. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(11), at 30, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714.
107 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(l), at 14-18, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647-48.
108 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005).
169U.S. CONST. amend. V.

170 See Fox, supra note 14, at 197. The invention would not experience a delay in profitability
because of the FDA approval process, so there is no front end distortion. The invention would not
experience back end distortion because the patent term of the patent owner would not effected by
the potentially infringing activities.
171 In this case, the delay of entry into the market is due to incomplete pharmaceutical
development, rather than a regulatory mechanism.
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resemble a compulsory licensing scheme.17 2 Inventors will choose to keep their
inventions as trade secrets, which, by avoiding disclosure, would not advance a
primary goal of the patent system.
Limiting the "invention" to the subject of study would rectify these problems.
There would no longer be a risk of a regulatory taking because there would be
minimal deprivation of economic value,17 3 and the promise of the right to exclude
would remain as incentive to disclose useful information to the public.

B. Exclude the Hunt for New Pharmaceuticalsfrom PermissibleActivities
It is tempting to provide an exemption to patent infringement for activities that
may provide the public with more, or better, drugs. Indeed, in the series of Merck
cases, the infringing acts converted a seemingly useless compound into a potentially
cancer curing agent. 174 This better, more efficient, use of resources should be
rewarded. It may seem that an easy solution to lowering the cost of drugs is to lower
the expense of pharmaceutical manufacture by providing incentives such as
exemptions from patent infringement to avoid licensing fees.
However, such
exemptions would be far from certain.
The problem with the current analysis of § 271(e)(1) is that there are no
definable boundaries to the exemption, and patent owners, as well as researchers,
will have no notice about potentially infringing acts. Because all research related to
a compound would be of interest to the FDA, and the compound never needs to be
submitted for approval to trigger the exemption, it is difficult to imagine what
information would not be included. The U.S.S.C. suggests that the way to delineate
the boundary is to examine the intent of the research 175 and to exclude research
17 6
conducted without intent to produce a drug.
This is certainly not the exemption envisioned by the legislature when it enacted
§ 271(e)(1).177
The U.S.S.C.'s interpretation of § 271(e)(1) is inconsistent with
172 See generallyGrace K. Avedissian, Note, GlobalImplications ofa PotentialUS. Policy Shift
Toward Compulsory Liensing of Medical Inventions in a Now Era of 'Super-Tnrrorirsm';18 AM.U.
INT'L L. REV. 237, 248-62 (2002) (providing an overview and analysis of U.S. and foreign positions
on compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals).
173 Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). Limiting the invention would lead to the
result reached by Congress in the debate of the Hatch-Waxman Act, because the infringing use
would be insubstantial. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(1), at 29-30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2686, 2713.
171Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378 (2005).
175 Id. at 2382. Examining intent in the context of patent infringement is controversial, and
has been deemed inappropriate in the context of the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997). This was also noted in Madey, where the court
noted the difficulty in analyzing intent in the context of the experimental use exception in light of
Warner-Jenkinson, but concluded "we do not view such an inconsistency as inescapable, and
conclude the experimental use defense persists albeit in the very narrow form articulated by this
court in Embrex." Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
176 Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382. The U.S.S.C. held that research performed without the intent to
develop a pharmaceutical should not be exempted. Id.
177 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(11), at 29-30, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2713-14. Congress
considered the issue of a taking, but ultimately decided that the infringement would be insignificant
and the benefits to the elderly and the poor by having faster generic pharmaceuticals would
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holdings of the courts that properly narrowed the experimental use exemption for
infringement, as there are substantial commercial objectives in the hunt for new
drugs.178 It is not logical to provide an exemption for research that satisfies "idle
curiosity," and for research that potentially finds new drugs, but not for academic
17 9
research which often falls in the middle.
The expansion of the § 271(e)(1) exemption to include the hunt for new drugs
goes beyond Congress's intent, and intrudes on patent owners' constitutional rights
to their property.180 Furthermore, allowing such a large class of researchers to use a
patented invention without compensation exceeds the boundaries of "de minimus"
use.181 The magnitude of the intrusion into the property rights is large, even though
it has been stated that "infringement is not a question of degree."18 2 To preserve the
patent owner's rights, the use of the invention should be strictly limited for purposes
"solely" related to FDA approval, as it is stated in the text of § 271(e)(1).183

IV. CONCLUSION

The U.S.S.C. expanded the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act's safe harbor
provision in Merck IfIto include protection for infringing use of any type of invention
as long as a researcher intended to perform research reasonably relevant to FDA
approval.184 This broad interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative intent of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the policies of the U.S. patent system. Many patent
owners may unnecessarily experience such a reduction in their property rights as to
constitute a regulatory taking.
The proposed narrow interpretation would rectify the constitutional problems
and inconsistencies in infringement exemptions. Section 271(e)(1) should apply only
to the invention studied, and even then, "solely" for the limited purpose of obtaining
outweigh the detriment to the "investment backed expectations." H.R.REP. NO. 98-857(11), at 29-30,
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2713 14.
178 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding the experimental use
exemption to be "very narrow and strictly limited"); Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d
1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a broad experimental use exception would violate the
patent laws if there were "definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes").
179 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
2002 Economie Census, Report: Seientifie Resources and
Development Services, No. EC02-541-07, tbl.2. There is a large disparity in profitability between
academic pursuits and pharmaceutical pursuits. Id. The revenue for tax exempt establishments
conducting scientific research was $18 billion, compared with $45 billion for establishments subject
to federal income tax. Id.
180 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(I), at 14-18, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647-48;
see also
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding trade-secrets to be a property
right that should be protected by the Fifth Amendment). The goals of the patent system are to
promote the progress of science by providing the right to exclude others from using, making or
selling an invention. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
1S H.R. REP. No. 98-857(11), at 30, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714. Congress relied on
the substantial nature of the use of the patented invention to determine a regulatory taking. Id.
182 Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 631 (1990).
The court criticized the
experimental use exception, stating that the damages may be small for certain infringing uses, but
the act of infringement is "not a question of degree." Id.
183 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
184 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005).
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FDA approval. This approach would allow courts to balance the need for safe and
effective drug equivalents with the right of the patent owner to the exclusive use of
his invention in addition to promoting the progress of science.

